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cene 1: Two graduate student women, Suzie and Janis, discuss a job 
application intended for a potential employer who has power over the 
writer—power linked with potential earnings and material conditions. As 
the writer Suzie (Korean American woman in her forties) moves toward 
strong assertions of her personal experience, qualifications, and skills relevant 
to the position, the tutor Janis (Jewish American woman in her early thirties) 
nods and responds with “yeah,” “uhm, hum,” and “right”—what sociolinguists 
call verbal continuers. Through these gestures, Janis supports Suzie’s assertions, 
which become part of the application. They collaborate in articulating and writ-
ing a job application that involves Suzie asserting her authority and economic 
worth, something she identifies as challenging because her experiences in gradu-
ate school have left her feeling less than qualified. Together, Janis and Suzie 
negotiate articulations of the writer’s credibility, and by doing so, they “write 
up” (akin to “speaking up”) to audiences with greater institutional power and 
more implicit right to speak.
Scene 2: Two friends and graduate student women of color (both black women 
in their late twenties/early thirties), Traci and Ella B., build solidarity that al-
lows Ella B. to assert herself when writing to her thesis committee within a 
predominantly white research university. Specifically, Ella B. writes about the 
representations of black women as the face of the black community, identifying 
what she terms a larger “damaged discourse.” Ella B. shows how this “damaged 
discourse” has been shaped from the outside by unrealistic expectations for what 
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the black community—and especially black women—should be. In making this 
analysis, Ella B. not only composes a strong critique, asserting her right to enter 
and alter academic discourse, but she also engages in self-representation. She 
shifts agency away from the damaged discourse she identifies having experienced 
herself and toward the act of black women writing their own stories. Acting in 
the tutor role, Traci supports this work by endorsing (verbally and nonverbally) 
both Ella B.’s claims and her act of asserting herself within the larger academic 
context that is largely silencing.
Scene 3: In a community literacy program, Christine (a white, working-class 
woman in her seventies) documents a series of medical misdiagnoses and wrong 
treatments as she advocates for changes to the US medical establishment. 
Theodore, the community literacy instructor (a white, graduate-student man in 
his thirties), affirms, clarifies, and helps to rewrite Christine’s narrative. When 
Theodore writes for Christine, he performs an act that risks disempowering 
her. Yet in working collaboratively, they together influence the distribution and 
reception of Christine’s work. As Christine “writes up” to be heard within large 
institutions (by physicians, health insurance companies, and health advocacy 
groups), the stakes are high. The stakes involve not the potential of employ-
ment that Suzie writes for or to counter the related academic gatekeeping and 
disciplinary construction of knowledge that Ella B. engages. Instead, Christine 
writes with the hopes of broadening access to needed medical procedures and 
quality health care. As such, she writes not only to reclaim her own agency and 
personhood that have been stripped away within the medical bureaucracy, but 
also to act responsibly so that others will not face the sense of victimization she 
has encountered over two decades.
In the three scenarios presented, we see different manifestations of epistemic 
injustice, or harm done to people in their capacities as knowers. This harm arises 
when people themselves or what they deem worth knowing are dismissed. In the 
first and second scenes, epistemic injustice manifests within graduate education. 
Suzie, the job applicant, finds her qualifications questioned, which undermines 
her accumulated experience and expertise. Similarly, as she writes her thesis, 
Ella B. finds herself having to fold her knowledge into that of others. Citation 
practices and committee expectations prioritize others’ arguments rather than 
recognize how an epistemological method (historiography) provides Ella B. with 
the means to know and to speak based on her original research. Suzie and Ella B. 
are not alone, but are among many scholars of color “presumed incompetent,” 
as documented in the recent edited collection by the same name (Gutiérrez y 
Muhs et al.). 
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Similarly, in the third scene, Christine’s rights to know and to claim to 
know about her body and her health are denied. In this case, epistemic injustice 
manifests within the decades-long struggle for healthcare professionals to rec-
ognize Christine as a source of knowledge about her body. As feminist political 
theorist Iris Young has explained: “Medical and service professionals know what 
is good for those they serve, and the marginals and dependents1 themselves do 
not have the right to claim to know what is good for them” (39, emphasis added). 
It is this “right to claim to know” that epistemic injustice undermines and that 
epistemic rights promote. As I argue throughout this article, efforts toward 
countering epistemic injustice—which is wound up with writing and English 
education—involve asserting and affirming epistemic rights, or the rights to 
knowledge, experience, and earned expertise.
By attending to interactions around writing, this article sheds light on 
moments when educators affirm and when writers assert their epistemic rights. 
Certainly an understanding of rhetoric as “epistemic” or “epistemological” is 
not new (e.g., Berlin; Dowst; Scott; Villanueva). When we put rhetoric and 
epistemology together, we recognize that writing makes meaning. Scholars 
have taught us that rhetoric is a “way of knowing” (Scott 17) that leads to “some 
understanding of ‘truth’” (Villanueva 5). When composing words, we are also 
composing understandings and knowledges (Dowst 66), hence constructing 
and making sense of ideology, power, and relations (Berlin 84–7). To say that 
rhetoric is epistemic, then, we link rhetoric with meaning-making, knowledge 
construction, and making sense of the world. 
Adding to the discipline’s understanding of rhetoric as epistemic, the lan-
guage of “rights” (i.e., epistemic rights) helps us to name how knowers (writers 
themselves) can be hurt, dismissed, or undermined. I argue that in composition 
and rhetoric, we need to bring attention to the related terms and conceptual 
frameworks of epistemic rights and epistemic injustice. In making this argument, 
I hope that we can build on the existing and foundational understandings of 
rhetoric as epistemic, but not stop there. Instead, these two terms—epistemic rights 
and epistemic injustice—help to explain the wrongs (micro-inequities leading to 
macro-injustices) that manifest when writers are stripped of language, experience, 
or expertise and their attendant agency, confidence, and even personhood. As 
such, this study highlights both the social stakes involved and the interactional 
work needed for putting one’s words into the world. 
Assertions of epistemic rights can counter epistemic injustice by contesting 
inequities and violations that are enabled through asymmetrical power relations, 
or power over. Asymmetrical power places epistemic demands on writers in a range 
of literacy contexts. Too often, asymmetrical power limits the voices and writing 
of people historically marginalized, disenfranchised, silenced, or controlled—
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for example, women, people of color, poor people (see, e.g., Gilyard; hooks; 
Horner, Lu, and Matsuda; Richardson; Spivak; I. Young; V. Young). Attention 
to epistemic rights underlines the work of “writing up” to audiences with greater 
institutional power and more implicit right to speak. When writing up, writers 
are positioned to “upgrade” their epistemic rights—that is, to assert authority in 
writing and to negotiate their agency and rights. (We might think of situations 
in which we’d be encouraged to “Speak up!” and what it would mean to say the 
parallel: “Write up!”) For example, writing up happens in educational and work 
contexts when students write to professors and applicants write to employers. It 
also happens in advocacy and community contexts, as we see Christine reclaim 
her personhood by advocating for healthcare reform.
To home in on this particularly powerful case of writing up, I focus on 
the ways in which Christine and Theodore act as partners—with Theodore 
effectively affirming and Christine effectively asserting epistemic rights. By 
contextualizing Christine and Theodore’s relationship and then focusing on a 
span of their talk, I analyze the interactional work involved in sharing Christine’s 
story of medical misdiagnoses and wrong treatments within an overwhelmingly 
large, complex, and powerful system of health insurance companies and medical 
providers in the United States. In their span of talk, Theodore helps to clarify 
Christine’s words by rewriting and seeking Christine’s confirmation of revisions. 
As a sign of true partnership, when Christine feels they have communicated ef-
fectively, she nods and visibly relaxes her whole body—releasing tense shoulders 
and settling into a relaxed stance. In this case, like in the contrasting ones with 
Suzie and Ella B., Christine authors by authorizing. Christine authorizes Theo-
dore’s revision of her writing, which counters the epistemic injustice that has 
resulted from years of doctors dictating the wrong solutions and those wrong 
solutions accumulating into a serious case of power abuse. 
What we see repeated over and over again is the importance of educators 
affirming writers in the work of writing up. In Christine’s case, Theodore lis-
tens, helps to clarify, and affirms the importance of her story. In Suzie’s case, 
Janis affirms that Suzie’s qualifications are worth sharing in her job application 
materials. In Ella B.’s case, Traci emphasizes the importance of committing 
Ella B.’s ideas to paper, again reinforcing their—and her—worth. These cases 
highlight the importance of educators recognizing writers’ rights and prioritiz-
ing relational pedagogy across educational sites, whether working on or off 
campuses, in mentoring or teacher-student relationships.
In what follows, I first delineate the central terms and conceptual frame-
works of epistemic injustice and epistemic rights. I draw especially on philoso-
pher Miranda Fricker’s study of epistemic injustice, of which she names two 
types—testimonial and hermeneutical; on sociolinguistics research by Harvey 
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Sacks, who distinguished between first-hand and removed rights to personal 
experience; and sociologists John Heritage and Geoffrey Raymond, who stud-
ied how individuals rank their rights to make assessments by upgrading and 
downgrading assertions through conversational turns. From there, I describe 
how the methodological approach of applied conversation analysis (CA) allows 
for recognizing affirmations and assertions of epistemic rights as they can be 
seen and studied in interactions around writing. I then attend closely to the case 
involving Christine and Theodore, comparing their interactions with those of 
Suzie and Janis in scene one and Ella B. and Traci in scene two. 
C o n C e p t u a l  F r a m e w o r k s :  
e p i s t e m i C  i n j u s t i C e  a n d  e p i s t e m i C  r i g h t s
Though we don’t often use the term epistemic rights in writing studies, I see 
value in adopting an understanding of rights as related to one’s entitlement to 
experience or knowledge—the basis on which we write or ask students to write. 
The term epistemic rights helps us to name the wrong done when, as Elaine Rich-
ardson says of school English, “It looks you in the face and tells you, you don’t 
even know what you know” (200). Through sharing her own story, Richardson 
relates how systemic injustice—like linguistic prejudice and racism—become 
everyday and personal, as individuals (and their experiences and knowledge) are 
discredited. Epistemic rights, therefore, encompass rights to know, experience, 
express, name, and narrate. And a concrete step toward upholding these rights 
is naming them as rights. As such, asserting epistemic rights in writing involves 
agency, particularly when writers are positioned to write up, or to navigate 
asymmetrical power—as is commonly the case when, for instance, applicants 
write to employers, students to instructors, consumers to corporations, or pa-
tients to physicians. Asymmetrical power is too often abused and writers too 
often dismissed when their contributions are not invited, preferred, taken up, 
or listened for as others’ might be.
Writers are denied these rights because of complex and intertwined preju-
dices, including linguistic prejudice (e.g., Zuidema), which can lead readers to 
unfairly deflate or dismiss some writers’ credibility. Though not named as such, 
this phenomenon of epistemic injustice is well documented not only in the Stu-
dents’ Right to Their Own Language (SRTOL) resolution, but also in subsequent 
work on language diversity (e.g., Horner, Lu, and Matsuda; Perryman-Clark, 
Kirkland, and Jackson; Richardson; Smitherman and Villanueva) and translin-
gualism (e.g., Canagarajah; Horner et al.). Scholars working on language policy 
have long been calling our attention to the ways in which linguistic prejudice 
underwrites the “writing off” of some people. This writing off, in turn, is related 
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to microinequities (Rowe) and microaggressions (e.g., Nadal; Sue et al.; Sue; V. 
Young) of which the “pathologizing of cultural values/communication styles” 
(Nadal 42–3) is a noted example.
Beyond writing studies, a number of philosophers and sociolinguists have 
taken up questions of epistemic agency, (in)justice, entitlement, and rights (e.g., 
Alcoff; Coady; Glen and LeBaron; Heritage and Raymond; Sacks; Spivak).2 
Among these researchers, Miranda Fricker provides an in-depth analysis of 
two types of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical in-
justice—and identifies the associations among power, prejudice, and the ethics 
of knowing. Fricker gives these definitions: 
Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when 
a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage 
when it comes to making sense of their social experiences. (1)
Both types of epistemic injustice are enabled by prejudice, and both have rippling 
effects of negatively affecting someone in their capacity as a knower—and, by 
extension, as a speaker, reporter, informant, communicator, and writer. 
Here I focus on testimonial injustice, which impacts a writer’s credibility 
and reception. Testimonial injustice helps us see the links among seemingly 
innocuous feedback, linguistic privilege and prejudice, wider systems of power 
and oppression, and the marginalization and dehumanization of writers. This 
injustice results in a whole host of primary and secondary harms, including at-
tacks on a person’s authority and, subsequently, on their human value. Think 
here of Gloria Anzaldúa’s line: “So, if you want to really hurt me, talk badly 
about my language” (59). Primary and secondary harms impact individuals on 
at least three levels: personal, social, and structural. For instance, Fricker shows 
that persistent testimonial injustice may result in internal impacts like the loss 
of intellectual courage, lowered self-confidence, and hindered educational 
development. As with other microinequities and microaggressions, the impact 
of epistemic injustice accumulates over time and feeds the very prejudices and 
related injustices that bring it about.
All three scenes that open this article illustrate testimonial injustice. In 
each case, systemic privilege and prejudice call into question and potentially 
undermine the writer’s right to know and to speak/write about what they know. 
Through this undermining, testimonial injustice impacts most people whose 
identity memberships are marginalized/oppressed/Othered in some way, whether 
because of race, class, gender, or other always-intersecting identities. Those 
privileged have their rights to know and judge elevated, receiving “epistemic 
excess” at the expense of others who have “epistemic deficit” (Fricker 17–40). 
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Then writers, who have not necessarily positioned or authorized themselves to 
“write up,” are covertly forced to counter testimonial injustice through simply 
writing, which provides the exigence for realizing rights. 
As a starting point for thinking about epistemic rights, we might consider 
the social stakes involved in speaking and, by extension, in writing. As socio-
linguists have taught us, we enact our identities, social positioning, and related 
rights through both verbal and nonverbal communication (e.g., Goffman; 
Heritage and Raymond; Maynard; Sacks; Thornborrow). This enactment is 
both “interactionally emergent and rhetorically negotiated” (Kerschbaum 6). 
As Stephanie Kerschbaum explains, “During interaction, people make minute, 
moment-by-moment decisions about how to act, how to accomplish desired 
positions, and how to respond to others” (83). Yet, interactional work differs 
according to our positions as speakers relative to others and within inequitable 
systems. These inequities impact who is—and who isn’t—entitled to speak and 
write. They also impact who is—and who isn’t—received or dismissed by oth-
ers. In Heritage and Raymond’s words, this “negotiation” and “management” 
of epistemic rights “is no trivial matter, but is rather a part of the interactional 
‘housekeeping’ that is a condition of personhood” (36). Though epistemic rights 
belong to all of us—are intrinsic, natural, and given rights, as well as a quality 
of personhood—they are systemically denied through “regulation and sanction-
ing” (36). Stripping epistemic rights not only denies people their production 
or reception of spoken words or written text, but also denies their personhood. 
The consequence is dehumanization.3
When we speak (and especially when we make claims and display authority), 
we commit those around us to recognizing our social worth, value, and right to 
speak. When we respond, we likewise demonstrate our recognition of others’ 
worth and rights. As Goffman explains, “[L]et a participant whom others would 
rather see silent make a statement, and he will have expressed the belief that he 
has a full right to talk and is worth listening to, thereby obliging his listeners 
to give a sign, however begrudging and however mean, that he is qualified to 
speak” (95). Just because an individual has a right to her own experience and the 
related right to speak about that experience, others may not recognize the right. 
Thus, responsiveness and respect (and their inverses: disrespect, discounting, 
and writing off) are negotiated—constructed as well as contested—in everyday 
interactions, all very much entwined with power relations and inequities. 
In addition to this understanding that epistemic rights are negotiated in 
real time in social interactions, sociolinguistic and conversation analytic research 
offers insights into how individuals “rank” their epistemic rights relative to others, 
particularly in the realm of personal, lived experience. For instance, Harvey Sacks 
distinguishes between first-hand rights—having witnessed, suffered, or been a 
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part of an experience—and second-hand, or removed rights—having received the 
experience through storytelling from another person. In witnessing and even 
suffering an experience, a person becomes “entitled” to it. Lived experience and 
subsequent tellings become the “property”—or within the realm of authority—of 
the person who has had access to the experience. It follows, then, that we each 
should be able to narrate our own lives; yet, doing so involves the assertion 
of one’s rights to self-determination. The value of personal experience is not 
assumed a priori, but is negotiated with recipients who are also acting out/in 
roles shaped by institutional power structures. As such, even when defined as 
entitlement to personal experience, epistemic rights are enacted inequitably, as 
personal experience may be undervalued or even discredited. 
Moving from Sacks to Heritage and Raymond’s work on epistemic rights, 
we can see that rights apply not only to personal experience, but also to making 
assessments and setting what they call “the terms of agreement.” Heritage and 
Raymond find that to offer an assessment, participants must have expertise or 
access to the state of affairs, events, or persons under discussion. Such expertise 
and access index the rights to evaluate and to claim knowledge. Because rights 
are ranked as first-hand/immediate or second-hand/mediated, speakers may 
upgrade or downgrade their rights to assess. As an example, when a speaker flatly 
asserts an evaluation, they also show direct, immediate, uncontested access to 
the state of affairs. In contrast, tag questions (like “you know?” or “right?”) may 
be used to defer to another speaker.4 Therefore, displays of epistemic rights are 
performed relative to others; these displays are contextually situated and locally 
enacted, even as they are expressions of power.5
Studying affirmations and assertions of epistemic rights, therefore, provides 
“a window into how the complexity of social structure is produced and reproduced 
through actual conduct” (Raymond and Heritage 701). Attention to microlevel 
interaction is far from mundane, idiosyncratic, or simply “small scale.” Rather, 
microlevel interactions are where epistemic injustice and microaggressions of 
various sorts occur and similarly where affirmations and assertions of epistemic 
rights can challenge asymmetrical power relations. As Joanne Thornborrow 
writes in Power Talk, “power relations in interaction are not necessarily fixed, 
predetermined states of affairs, but are constantly shifting and being redefined 
between participants on a local level” (134). The negotiation, maintenance, and 
restructuring of asymmetrical power, therefore, can be studied by looking at 
how participants use discursive strategies, resources, and roles—all in the mo-
ment. Hence, a methodological contribution of this study is the use of applied 
conversation analysis (CA) for studying the interactional work that reveals how 
epistemic injustice and epistemic rights are critical concepts for writing studies. 
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m e t h o d o l o g i C a l  a p p r o a C h :  
w h y  a t t e n d  t o  m o m e n t s  o F  i n t e r a C t i o n
Building on previous research describing the writing-speaking connection 
(Sperling) and on conversation-analytic studies of writing conferences (e.g., 
Olinger; Strauss and Xiang; Thompson), this mixed-method project uses CA’s 
powerful methodological and theoretical approach to identify the moment-by-
moment negotiation of epistemic rights. CA allows for microlevel analysis of 
macro-societal problems, as it brings attention to talk and embodied interaction.6 
CA allows us to study interactional, relational work that we typically attribute 
as having value, though fail to analyze. Hence, what is most prominent is a 
CA rendering of just two minutes of collaborative composing, or “writing 
up.” During these two minutes, Theodore and Christine revise a sentence to 
articulate the problem of limited physical therapy. Though the sentence focuses 
on physical therapy, it communicates much more. It alludes to the epistemic 
injustice that denied Christine’s knowledge of and participation in her own health 
care and also constrained the epistemic authority of her physicians and physical 
therapists. More than that, this moment is significant for the interactional work 
and embodied response as Theodore affirms Christine’s epistemic rights and 
as Christine responds gesturally by relaxing her body. Her physical release 
of tension correlates with her choice to represent the problem in a way that 
emphasizes the wrong/harm done. Studying such a moment, therefore, helps 
us see the links between in-the-moment embodied interaction and the work of 
asserting one’s epistemic rights through writing and revision. 
Because applied CA invites—even necessitates—in-depth analysis of em-
bodiment as part of language and social action (e.g., Streeck; Goodwin), this 
article includes attention to gesture, gaze, and physical positioning. In com-
position and rhetoric, we have sometimes treated embodiment or “embodied 
rhetorics” as separate from or in addition to language and text production—a 
critique launched by Will Banks and Amy Winans, among others. Yet, conversa-
tion analysts understand both verbal and nonverbal action as integrated semiotic 
resources and in need of especially detailed and related exploration. Because 
this exploration asks us to slow down and zoom in on the microlevel, I focus on 
Christine and Theodore (pseudonyms). The other two opening scenes, which 
involve participants Suzie, Janis, Ella B., and Traci (all pseudonyms), provide 
contrast and breadth to the argument, serving as comparatives to the central case.7
The article’s cases come from a larger study, in which I collected three 
types of data: (1) videotaped writing conferences; (2) interviews with writers 
and tutors conducted over time—both initially when video-recording and over 
a span of five years, as participants continued to write and meet together; and 
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(3) documents given to me by the participants. I focus primarily on the interviews, 
which a research assistant and I coded, and on the videotaped one-with-one 
writing conferences, which I analyzed using applied CA. For additional context, 
I make use of the following documents: correspondence between Christine, 
her physicians, and her insurance company; a detailed seventeen-page medical 
history that Christine composed; and a letter from a patient advocate. Similar 
documents help me contextualize other cases. 
One-with-one writing conferences take place regularly in campus writing 
centers and community literacy programs. I chose to study these sites because 
they exemplify the types of spaces and relations in which people typically seek 
feedback, engage in writing instruction, and make revisions of both texts and 
ideas, as I argue elsewhere (Godbee, Small Talk). That is, in everyday life, when 
people write, they turn to family, friends, neighbors, librarians, religious leaders, 
and others in their lives—other literary sponsors (Brandt, Literacy)—as we know 
from research on composition’s extracurriculum (e.g., Gere; Heller). Writing 
centers and community literacy programs are often compared to classroom 
settings, with the focus on educational context. Alternatively, these sites can 
bring attention to the variable, everyday, and personalized nature of writing 
talk and feedback, particularly when done in sustained affiliative relationships, 
the focus of my larger study. 
Such an affiliative relationship is exemplified in Theodore and Christine’s 
interactions, which help us see not only the ways in which different knowledges 
do—and don’t—count, but also the ways in which educators can support writers 
in reclaiming and asserting their rights to knowledge. Studying these sites can 
lead to pedagogical recommendations for those of us engaged in teaching—in 
campus and community writing centers as well as teacher-student conferences 
and other interactions. And, yet, the implications do not stop there. Instead, 
as I discuss in the conclusion, understanding the relational, embodied, and en-
gaged work of one-with-one writing instruction helps us understand the value 
of relational, embodied, engaged pedagogy, more generally. We all, as English 
educators, have a lot to learn from particularly powerful moments in which 
educators relate with writers and affirm their rights.
C a s e  s t u d y :  t h e o d o r e  a n d  C h r i s t i n e  
C o l l a b o r a t i v e l y  “ w r i t e  u p ”
I turn now to the case in which Theodore and Christine collaboratively “write 
up” to powerful health insurance companies, physicians, and advocacy groups. In 
doing so, Christine assumes a writer’s identity, which contributes to her larger 
goal of influencing healthcare reform. 
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Experiencing and Countering Epistemic Injustice. 
Christine has a story of repeated and persistent epistemic injustice, specifically 
testimonial injustice. Though she doesn’t name it as such, she talks about epis-
temic injustice when describing how physicians denied her physical experiences 
with pain, when identifying how her literacy background and high school educa-
tion don’t speak well to insurance companies, and when saying how others read 
her as “a little old lady.”8 The various dismissals she has encountered are based 
on her status as a patient as well as her educational background, class, gender, 
and age—identity memberships linked with asymmetrical power. Fricker shows 
that many features of our identities carry “epistemic charge” (17). Prejudice 
toward particular identities is associated with “credibility deficit” and its inverse, 
“credibility excess.” The result Fricker names as “identity-prejudicial credibility 
deficit” (17–40). What Christine, Suzie, and Ella B. alike face when writing up 
highlights the links among identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, epistemic in-
justice, and other types of abuse and wrongdoing, such as harm to the physical 
body in Christine’s case and potential harms to one’s ability to gain access, earn 
degrees, and find employment for Suzie and Ella B.
Christine was wronged not simply through the misdiagnoses and inattention 
to an underlying muscular-vascular condition (i.e., harm to the body) but also 
and significantly because she was made to feel that she couldn’t participate in 
her own care (i.e., epistemic harm). As Christine writes in her medical history, 
her knowledge about her own body was undermined:
It is clear that my problems were vascular. Yet, I was made to feel unreasonable, 
almost hysterical, for demanding a simple and inexpensive treadmill test that 
would show a lack of blood flow to my legs with exercise. Even after my doctors 
ordered this test, I had to fight for it. 
We know that women’s bodies have long been a source of domination and so-
cial control (e.g., I. Young). The fact that Christine chose “unreasonable” and 
“hysterical” to describe how she was made to feel indicates that the epistemic 
injustice she faced was likely tied to gender, given the etymology of hysteria9 and 
accountings of how women’s pain is downplayed or dismissed by physicians (e.g., 
Fassler; Hoffman and Tarzian). And the wrong done to Christine’s physical body 
is very much connected with (co-occurring, if not feeding into) the wrong done 
to her as a knower. Hence, physical pain or wrongdoing to the body is linked 
with the mental-emotional pain of being discounted or facing a credibility deficit.
Likely because of her deep sense of being wronged, Christine persisted in 
writing letters, filing complaints, and submitting editorials for years. During 
her time working with Theodore and other tutors with the community literacy 
program (more than seven years), Christine drafted and revised substantially 
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(several times and for different audiences) a medical case history totaling seven-
teen single-spaced pages in 10-point font: quite a lengthy and detailed medical 
history. This document served as the base text from which she created shorter 
letters, blog posts, editorials, and other public writing to share her story. Over 
the years, Christine’s goals evolved and became more about influencing neigh-
bors and nurses than about whether physicians or health insurance companies 
responded. In this way, Christine’s writing became what Paula Mathieu calls 
“public writing,” or “an end in itself” (46), rather than (purely) “transactional 
writing,” or “a means to something else” (46). 
Christine’s medical narrative spans the years 1994 to 2007, during which 
time Christine held insurance with a local provider and saw four different 
physicians (three of them specialists) within the group’s clinics. In some ways, 
Christine seems to have fallen through the gaps as specialists addressed different 
symptoms and failed to make connections. In other ways, Christine seems to 
have a case of failing to be heard or taken seriously because, though she educated 
herself and took an active role in her care, she was denied the test she requested 
and that ultimately proved important to her treatment. Christine explains in 
her medical history:
Had these physicians honored my request for a simple, non-invasive Doppler 
test with treadmill10 at any point along the way, my condition would have been 
diagnosed. Instead, because of these doctors’ misdiagnoses, I had to endure 
numerous, unwarranted procedures and treatments. I had to undergo years of 
physical therapy, two back surgeries, a number of angioplasties, and a fem-fem 
bypass (which was performed too late to be effective). Furthermore, for 15 years I 
had to live with daily leg pain, painful surgeries, recoveries, and the accompanying 
stress caused by these conditions and procedures. 
In 2007, Christine changed jobs and so also changed insurance providers. The 
new insurance allowed her to seek treatment at the Mayo Clinic, and she did so 
with the support of a patient advocate who charged the Mayo physicians with 
helping to make sense of “a confusing medical history going back some 15 years.” 
At Mayo, Christine found physical relief from a correct diagnosis and related 
treatment plan. She also became more deeply aware of how previous misdiagnoses 
and unneeded surgeries left her with chronic pain and trauma to the physical 
body, including nerve damage and scar tissue. In interviews, Christine described 
writing as her primary way to make sense of the trauma and “to make change,” 
or to intervene into the epistemic and other injustices she faced. Christine’s 
writing, therefore, was truly “public writing,” or an end in itself.
Asserting and Affirming Epistemic Rights. 
Turning now to the span of talk, we can see Theodore’s significant role in the 
composing process. Theodore helps Christine explain how the combination of 
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misdiagnoses, limits of health insurance, and inattention from physicians led to 
medical complications that continue to impact her quality of life. Specifically, 
Theodore teases out Christine’s insights into “the maximum amount” of physical 
therapy allowed. Then, making use of her insider knowledge, Theodore helps 
to clarify the agent who sets this maximum: the insurance company, who had a 
blanket policy, instead of the patient and healthcare provider determining need. 
Because of the insurance policy, not only was Christine’s epistemic knowledge 
denied, but also her doctors’ and physical therapists’ epistemic knowledge was 
conditional on limits set by the insurance company. Through proposing sentence-
level revisions, Theodore both demonstrates his understanding of this problem 
and engages Christine as a knower with insights to share. 
Advice for writing tutors and teachers often cautions against taking a direc-
tive approach, likely because of concerns that educators will “take over” writers’ 
texts, agency over the writing process, or ownership of ideas. Cautions against 
“taking over,” I believe, are implicitly cautions against infringing writers’ epis-
temic rights. Yet, these cautions oversimplify the ways in which educators (at 
their best) work in collaborative partnerships and as thinking partners to support 
writers in claiming their own rights. In recent years, writing center scholarship 
has questioned the advice that tutors should be nondirective. Isabelle Thomp-
son, John Nordlof, and others have shown that effective mentoring/consulting 
conversations occur along a continuum with genuine interactions including 
directive feedback. Even if Theodore’s approach is seen as running counter to 
traditional writing center beliefs about nondirective tutoring, his approach is 
reflective of what empirical research indicates that tutors actually do. When 
Theodore suggests revisions and types directly into Christine’s document, he 
does so in partnership with Christine. Christine, in turn, maintains strongly that 
their process is “mutual” and “my own,” which is confirmed through videotaped 
interactions. Their process is similar to what Janis, Traci, and other tutors in 
this study do, as direct suggestions for revision are offered as part of genuine 
back-and-forth exchanges. What I’d like to underline is that direct or directive 
feedback does not necessarily co-opt a writer’s ownership of writing. Rather, 
when offered as part of a collaborative partnership, direct feedback, revision, and 
even rewriting, as Theodore offers, can affirm a writer’s ability to “write up.”
In this case, Christine maintains primary access and rights to her personal 
experience. When Theodore writes (essentially coauthoring or ghostwriting), 
he affirms Christine’s epistemic rights by confirming her experience, seeking 
her approval on changes so that Christine retains sole authorship of the text, 
and rewriting in a way that magnifies her stated problem. Though revision at 
the sentence-level might be dismissed as simple revision, it represents a long 
back-and-forth exchange in which Theodore models and supports the writer’s 
journey at best articulating experience. Theodore bolsters Christine so that 
i593-618-July17-CE.indd   605 6/19/17   1:47 PM
 606 College English
she can share her story in an effective, rhetorical way. In doing so, he affirms 
the writer, the writer’s right to experience, and the writer’s articulation of that 
experience. Even when seemingly “directive,” Theodore is not silencing, but 
upholding, Christine’s epistemic rights.
By analyzing two minutes of talk, we find that Theodore attends to Chris-
tine: he looks at her, listens carefully, and asks a series of clarifying questions that 
are crucial to knowing how to frame her experience. Within these two minutes, 
Theodore and Christine revise the sentence in italics: 
The nurse also informed me that the doctor suggested I get a good sports doctor 
instead. I felt devastated. What would a sports doctor do for me when I’d already had 
eleven years of the maximum of physical therapy?
The italicized sentence evolves to this revision:
What would a sports doctor do for me when over the last eleven years I’d already 
had the maximum amount of physical therapy allowed by insurance, repeated 
Doppler tests, numerous nerve tests, and two back surgeries?
As a sample of the larger text, this excerpt shows how Christine (with Theo-
dore’s input) positions herself as an agent and actor over her own experience. 
Theodore’s clarification doesn’t dismiss Christine as unreasonable or hysterical 
(as she feels the physicians have done), but instead allows Christine to explain 
the limits of physical therapy. Studying how this revision is made helps us to 
understand how writing up happens. 
Turning now to the transcript of these minutes, I want to explain the 
notations that represent Theodore and Christine’s interaction.11 Overlapping 
speech is marked with brackets, pauses are timed in tenths of seconds, increased 
volume is represented by capitalization, and vocalized stress is underlined. For 
simplicity, few nonverbal actions are described, but those actions essential for 
understanding appear in italics inside double-parentheses (e.g., ((nods))). Lines 
are numbered for easy reference in the analysis that follows:
 1 T: uhm. it was th- the MAximum amount was because of insurance? is that?
    2  (0.4) ((Theodore turns his gaze from the computer to Christine))
 3 T: like the maximum amount of physical therapy allowed by [the insurance?]
 4 C:                    [every year       ] 
 5 C: I probably had physical therapy I didn’t know how to make it but
    6  (0.4)
 7 C: uh I’ve had physical therapy. (.) the [maximum the insurance would prov-
 8 T:                                        [oh okay ((nods)) 
 9 C: EVery year
 10 T: righ[t ((nods))
 11 C:       [for all of those years, uh they had me trying to walk on water, and 
  [[. . . ]]
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Lines 12 to 93 are deleted for space. Here, Theodore confirms that the doctors 
had Christine “trying to walk on water” and says with laughter, “I guess they 
were hoping for a miracle.” 
Christine does not laugh and responds instead, “Yeah, I guess so” (with the emo-
tional tenor of sadness and perhaps bitterness). She relates more of her history 
with physical therapy—that she could not walk from the parking lot into the 
doctor’s office. Line 94 resumes after this explanation with Theodore confirming:
 94 T: okay. that all makes sense. the REAson why I was asking about that was
  95  just because when you’re saying the maximum amount uh it raises the question
  96  of maximum amount because why right in other words- was it because that’s
  97    all your body could [take? or was it because
 98 C:                                 [no. ((shakes head))
 99 T:  that was all [that you were allowed to do and SO 
100 C:                   [oh ((shakes head)) 
101 T:  I was just [thinking if we could just say, .hh [allowed by insurance] then that
102 T:                 [((left hand points to screen))            [((tracks fingers across screen))        
103 C:                                                       [allowed by insurance]
104 T:  just makes it jus that [little bit] more clear 
105 C:                    [okay.    ]
106 T: does that [make se-?
107 C:                  [alright m-okay ((nods))
108 T: So, So, instead of reading 
109   (0.5)    
110 T: uhm (0.3) what would a sports doctor do for me, when I had already had 
111  eleven years with the maximum of physical therapy. .hh 
112 T: instead of reading that way, um the the new way, would read (0.6) what would a 
113  sports doctor do for me, (0.4) ((swallows)) when over the last eleven years I’d 
114  already had the maximum amount of physical therapy allowed by insurance, 
115  repeated Doppler tests numerous nerve tests and two back surgeries.
116 C: mhm, excellent hhm hhm- [I yes I            ] uh yes 
117 T:                                            [you like that?]
118 C: I [like that. ((nods and visibly relaxes whole body))
119 T:   [okay 
Concurrent to lines 118 and 119, Christine nods, opens her mouth, moves her 
shoulders side-to-side, and then settles into a more relaxed position with a vis-
ible release of tension.
A close analysis of this span of talk reveals more than a mundane compos-
ing sequence (a sentence-level revison). Theodore and Christine work toward 
a fuller description of the limits of physical therapy, which builds toward a full 
embodied release of tension when Christine nods and moves back and forth—
from tight lips to openness of her mouth speaking; from her head held straight 
and forward toward the computer to a dip from side-to-side. This physical 
release and build-up to the final utterances (“You like that?” and “I like that”) 
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stand as an important counterpoint to the assaults on Christine’s body and the 
accompanying tension that she visibly carries. When Theodore turns from the 
computer, gazes at Christine, and asks “the maximum amount was because of 
insurance?” (line 1), he positions Christine as the informant and author of her own 
experience, giving her epistemic authority to clarify the reason for a maximum 
of physical therapy. Christine continues looking at the computer, frowning, so 
after a pause (line 2), Theodore asks a second time and again provides a possible 
explanation for the maximum: “like the maximum amount of physical therapy 
allowed by insurance?” (line 3). Rather than simply affirming this reason (yes 
or no), Christine emphasizes the time involved: “Every year, I probably had 
physical therapy . . . the maximum insurance would provide every year . . . for 
all of those years” (lines 4–11). By repeating “every year” twice (lines 4 and 9) 
and then adding “for all those years” (line 11), Christine emphasizes not why 
the maximum was in place, but that she did the maximum amount for many 
years—perhaps emphasizing the effort she put in and the struggle involved. 
As Christine elaborates on her physical therapy experience, beginning in 
line 11 with “they had me trying to walk on water” and continuing through line 
93, Theodore gives his absolute attention to Christine. Throughout Christine’s 
explanation, Theodore gazes at Christine (not the computer screen), leaning 
back so that his body is away from the computer. Theodore’s body positioning 
communicates his changed stance from writer/typer to listener/receiver. Picking 
up at line 94, Theodore responds to Christine’s accounts, “okay, that all makes 
sense”—providing confirmation that he has heard and understood Christine—
and then gives an accounting for his original question: “The reason why I was 
asking about that just because when you’re saying the maximum amount, it raises 
the question of maximum amount why. In other words, was it because that’s all 
your body could take, or that was all that you were allowed to do?” (lines 94–99). 
Throughout Theodore’s explanation, he and Christine are gazing at each other, 
so that he is able to see Christine shake her head (line 98) when he gives the 
first (incorrect) explanation “because that’s all your body could take?” (line 97). 
When he gives the second (correct) explanation—“or was it because that was all 
that you were allowed to do?” (lines 97 and 99)—Christine overlaps with “oh” 
and again shakes her head (line 100), indicating that she has understood the 
possible confusion. Throughout this sequence, Theodore shows a willingness 
to listen and learn from Christine’s first-hand knowledge. To support her lived 
experience, he works to clarify and construct the narrative for its intended/initial 
audience—physicians and health insurance companies—who hold institutional 
power over Christine.
After once again clarifying his initial question with “I was just thinking if 
we could just say allowed by insurance, then that just makes it just that little bit 
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more clear. Does that make sense?” (lines 101–6), Theodore shifts his orienta-
tion back to the computer screen and gives a preface to reading aloud—“so, so 
instead of reading” (line 108). He reads first the original sentence Christine had 
written and second his revised version. The revision not only clarifies “maximum 
amount of physical therapy allowed by insurance,” but also includes the addi-
tional problems of having (1) repeated Doppler tests, (2) numerous nerve tests, 
and (3) two back surgeries—problems that have all been established earlier in 
the conference. More than simply saying “I hear you” or “I see that you’ve been 
through a lot,” Theodore’s revision communicates, in writing and in his own 
words, that he has understood the magnitude of Christine’s health problems and 
the ways she has felt mistreated. By keeping the sentence in question form “What 
would a sports doctor do for me when . . .?” he maintains a tone of frustration, 
and by adding the list that puts physical therapy in relation to other tests and 
surgeries, he communicates clearly that Christine has exhausted all possibilities. 
Before Theodore completes his revised sentence (lines 112–5), Christine 
has begun nodding, physically releasing her tight lips and tense shoulders that 
are visibly apparent at the start of this sequence. As Theodore finishes the 
sentence, Christine offers agreement “mhm,” followed by “excellent” and then 
another “hhm hhm” and a direct “yes” (line 116), all coordinated with her head 
dipping side-to-side, while smiling. When Theodore asks in line 117, “You 
like it?” Christine has already answered with nonverbal and verbal agreement, 
and still she says directly, “I like that” with an emphasis and upward intonation 
on “like” (line 118), making absolutely certain that she likes the revision. The 
moment communicates what looks like an emotional release (a whole relaxing 
of the body). The release may be from having the idea expressed well. It may 
be that Christine has had her experience received, affirmed, and then revised 
in more forceful language. It may be from having it expressed by Theodore, 
someone with “epistemic excess” relative to her own in the situation. It may even 
be that Theodore has helped to reroute epistemic authority—to use Deborah 
Brandt’s term for how ghostwriting can redirect the flow of “real and symbolic 
values of writing” (“Who’s the President?” 561). At least in part, what we see 
here is Theodore helping to elevate Christine’s epistemic authority, disrupting 
epistemic excess/deficit. 
Here we see evidence that Christine authors her story by authorizing Theo-
dore to make strong claims based on her experiences. Theodore, in turn, writes 
from Christine’s point of view, since she preserves sole authorship over a truly 
coauthored piece of writing. Even though assertions are mutually constructed, 
they remain Christine’s when she submits them to health insurance companies, 
the doctors involved, online advocacy groups, local patient advocacy organiza-
tions, and celebrity advocates Oprah Winfrey and Michael Moore. In this way, 
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Theodore affirms Christine’s epistemic rights so that she is able to assert them. 
What could easily become appropriation of Christine’s text becomes something 
else—something co-constitutive—when Theodore responds to Christine’s verbal 
and nonverbal cues in the moment. 
The moment Christine began asserting her rights, she also began identifying 
herself as a writer, publishing excerpts of her detailed medical history and 
stepping into the role of advocate. Christine’s writing occurs at a time of national 
debates and complaints over health care and, within this larger context, can be 
seen as part of a loosely woven social movement. Through “writing up,” Christine 
“rights a wrong”—documenting that even as one person, one patient, she matters. 
Though Christine reports that she has never heard a meaningful response from 
the health insurance companies or physicians,12 she did influence others with her 
writing. Among these, a nurse at the Mayo Clinic shared Christine’s story with 
another patient who requested the correct testing and avoided surgery; a minister 
showed interest in the story and shared it with members of his congregation; 
several neighbors said they couldn’t believe what Christine had been though and 
shared stories of their own, leading to renewed and deepened relationships; and 
her daughter said it was an important testament to what they’d been through 
together. With Theodore’s help, Christine also posted a shortened version of 
her narrative on a blog, which she continues to monitor years later for comments 
and number of visitors. As Christine says, “it was all worth a try,” and “it made 
me a writer”—a writer who continues to visit the community literacy program. 
Now, years after this advocacy work, Christine is writing a memoir chronicling 
major life events, many of them painful in reliving. But in reliving through 
writing, she says she is able to release the held emotions of anger and sadness: 
“When I finish writing a story, I can let go of it.” So, even as it is difficult to 
trace wider impact of Christine’s writing, it is possible to see how the agency 
involved in claiming, naming, and telling one’s truth aligns with asserting one’s 
epistemic rights.
Supporting Writers and Writing Up across Contexts. 
Like this central case study, the opening scenes have a lot to teach English educa-
tors about how we can affirm writers’ epistemic rights, what interactional work 
supports writers in asserting their rights, and how (re)claiming epistemic rights 
can enable writers to meet their writing goals. In the opening scenes, we met 
Suzie, who is working to assert her qualifications for a job application, and Ella 
B., who is writing a masters thesis on damaged discourses facing black women. As 
educators, we may think about the diverse contexts in which writers face epistemic 
injustice. For example, genres of résumés, cover letters, and job applications call 
upon writers to make a number of strong and positive self-assessments, to state 
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clearly their qualifications, and to write from a position of confidence. When 
Suzie talks through how to represent herself in these documents, she describes 
feeling diminished in graduate school, an experience familiar to many of us and 
well-documented by the contributors to Presumed Incompetent: The Intersections 
of Race and Class for Women in Academia. This collection shows that “the culture 
of academia is distinctly white, heterosexual, middle- and upper-middle-class” 
(Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. 3); faculty who differ from this norm are “‘presumed 
incompetent’ by students, colleagues, and administrators” (3). This experi-
ence is magnified for graduate students and enacted largely through everyday 
microaggressions. Similar to the ways in which Christine has been made to 
feel “unreasonable” and “hysterical,” experiencing trauma to her body and to 
her self, Suzie and Ella B., as graduate student women of color, face epistemic 
injustice persistently in ways that cause trauma. This trauma must be addressed 
as part of “writing up.” 
When Suzie begins writing her job application materials, she begins by pro-
cessing the experiences—the trauma and epistemic injustice—of graduate school. 
Like Theodore, Janis responds by listening carefully, relates experiences of her 
own in a relational move of “troubles telling” (Godbee, “Toward Explaining”); 
and, perhaps most importantly, affirms Suzie’s experiences. In turn, over the 
course of an hour-long writing conference, Suzie begins to speak more clearly 
about her many qualifications and community connections she could bring to 
a new job. Janis affirms Suzie simply, but positively—nodding, smiling, and 
offering verbal continuers, such as “right,” “yeah,” and “definitely.” In doing 
so, Janis gives Suzie the space to talk through her experiences and then affirms 
that her qualifications matter. They can—should—be written down and shared 
with the potential employer. Though the employer has power over Suzie and 
though Suzie is positioned to write up and, therefore, may not be heard, she 
writes from a recognition of her right to speak/write, reclaiming her epistemic 
rights in the process. 
Similarly, Ella B. and Traci collaboratively support each other in thriving 
(not just surviving) in academia. Over the year that Ella B. writes her masters 
thesis, they meet weekly: talking through experiences, ideas, and arguments; 
reading, revising, and rewriting text; and commiserating over roadblocks, while 
celebrating successes. Like Theodore and Janis, Traci supports Ella B. by affirm-
ing the value of Ella B.’s insights—by indicating, often gesturally, that she has 
heard and understood Ella B.’s arguments, that they have value, and that they 
deserve to be shared with others. To illustrate, toward the end of a conference 
in which Ella B. works to assert the central argument of her thesis, Ella B. makes 
a strong and succinct claim: “The discourse is that black men and the Black 
Panther Party are the saviors of black women.” Traci responds by snapping her 
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fingers—a snap that punctuates the idea like an exclamation mark. Traci then 
begins “air writing”—moving her finger in the air as though it’s a pen—while 
smiling, laughing, and saying “That’s right! Let ’em know!” Traci’s gestures, 
words, and physical demeanor all indicate the importance of committing this 
sentence to paper. In response, Ella B. begins writing, also while laughing. The 
fully embodied and overlapping laughter of this moment, co-occurring with air 
writing and actual writing, is very much like Christine’s embodied relief expressed 
through the sigh and shoulders relaxing. These gestures speak to the importance 
of sharing with another person the experience of writing, particularly writing 
that expresses, if not reclaims, epistemic rights.
Across these scenes, writing up (like speaking up or talking back) can be seen 
as courageous, as bell hooks reminds us: “To speak when one was not spoken to 
[is] a courageous act—an act of risk and daring” (5). Will potential employers 
pass over Suzie’s application, failing to see her worth? Will Ella B.’s committee 
negatively evaluate the writing—and the writer—blocking her path in higher 
education? Will the health insurance companies fail to respond to Christine 
or respond rudely? Despite these and numerous other risks, the writers in this 
study keep writing and, in the process, counter epistemic injustice as they make 
sense of trauma. Suzie, Ella B., Christine, and almost all the writers in the larger 
study characterize their writing relationships as “therapeutic.” Christine, for 
instance, likens writing conferences to the healing and health care she has so 
ardently sought: “For me, it’s such a relief when I walk out of there. It’s like 
I’ve just gone for a good massage.” Writing and writing relationships may help 
to transform experiences of physical, emotional, and even epistemic harm into 
active work to prevent harm from happening to others. For educators, this work 
involves relating with writers and affirming their epistemic rights.
C o n C l u d i n g  t h o u g h t s :  a  C a l l  F o r  e d u C a t o r s  
t o  a F F i r m  e p i s t e m i C  r i g h t s 
Through the central case study and opening scenes, I have argued that the act 
of “writing up” makes a strong assertion of epistemic rights, and that when 
writers (re)claim their epistemic rights, they can more easily achieve or expand 
their writing goals. The tutors in this study help us consider the role of others, 
especially educators, in this process. Specifically, Theodore, Janis, and Traci 
exhibit a relational pedagogy—one that builds and sustains relationships over 
time and prioritizes the people involved. As a pedagogical approach, relational, 
embodied, engaged pedagogy is not limited to any particular site—not to writing 
centers or community writing programs. Instead, it is an approach that invites 
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educators to think about our deepest commitments to writers and to affirm 
epistemic rights. And what this research suggests is that when educators affirm 
writers’ epistemic rights, writers may more easily reclaim and assert their rights, 
thereby countering epistemic injustice.
In highlighting the importance of relational pedagogy, what I’d like to un-
derline is that the educators I’ve studied (the tutors) consistently prioritize the 
people with whom they work (the writers). As such, their pedagogical approach 
sometimes involves doing less and sometimes involves doing more than is commonly 
recommended for educators. In terms of doing less, Janis, Traci, and Theodore 
alike actively listen and refrain from offering advice. They provide nonverbal 
gestures of support, such as nods and laughs, as well as verbal continuers like 
“yeah” and “right.” These seemingly small acts serve as important affirmations 
as writers take on the difficult task of writing up. In terms of doing more, Janis, 
Traci, and Theodore alike contribute direct rewording of ideas and sentences 
when doing so can strengthen the writers’ efforts at writing up. These seemingly 
large—and potentially overstepping—acts again serve as important affirmations, 
especially of the tutor’s deep investment in the writer and their success. In other 
words, the balance of holding back and yet not withholding seems important for 
any educator thinking about how to enact a relational pedagogy.
For the field of writing studies, this study suggests the need to rethink—or 
to think more explicitly—about educators’ roles in countering epistemic injustice 
and affirming writers’ epistemic rights. Many instructors across disciplines and 
in a variety of K–university contexts similarly want students to analyze, speak 
back to, and feel they can make new and provocative claims; yet, students often 
fail to make strong claims, in part, because they feel they have no right to speak 
to published authors, credentialed scholars, or established fields of study. What 
might educators do to support writers in these everyday acts of writing up? 
For classroom instructors and community literacy educators alike, we need to 
understand the conditions and relations as well as the genres and assignments 
that support writing up. 
As one starting point into this work, we might return to Paula Mathieu’s 
distinction between transactional writing (outcomes oriented) and public writing 
(process based and civic minded): “Public writing in our group began (or gained 
energy) at the point where transactional writing failed. When individual efforts 
at finding employment, housing, or another form of justice proved unsuccessful, 
writers turned to public writing out of frustration or a desire for social change” 
(35). Mathieu describes public writing as arising out of frustration (likely epis-
temic injustice) and yet motivating more writing (likely through assertions of 
epistemic rights). This description matches how Christine’s sense of purpose 
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not only changed over time, but also focused on creating personal meaning from 
the work, reaching local audiences identified through relational networks, and 
engaging in broader social change. 
If educators are to take the potential of writing up seriously, then we might 
think more about such “public writing,” particularly as it occurs in community 
settings and can be built into classrooms. Such writing prioritizes the process 
and the potential to make change. In other words, we might consider more how 
assignments themselves can better support writers in recognizing their own 
worth, countering epistemic injustice, and re(claiming) their epistemic rights. 
Rather than assuming students can—and should—assume an authoritative voice, 
even when writing up to us (their teachers), we can do more—much more. We 
can engage in self-reflection on our own actions, expectations, interactions 
with writers, and assignment designs. And we can encourage writers to simi-
larly learn about and reflect on matters of epistemic authority, demand, excess, 
deficit, injustice, and rights. These concepts are all very much entwined with 
asymmetrical power and invite us all to think more about the directionality of 
writing, particularly what it means to write up.
Finally, all of us engaged in writing and literacy education should develop a 
language for talking with writers about their epistemic rights. I hope to contribute 
toward identifying why, when, and how writers contest epistemic injustice and 
assert epistemic rights. Additional work is needed toward understanding—and 
describing, naming, and narrating—the navigational work of writing up. Think of 
what acknowledging this work’s academic value could mean for writing research. 
Might we shift from cautions and concerns about directive teaching into research 
that considers the conditions in which directive feedback co-opts, rather than 
affirms, writers’ rights? Might scholarship on audience address matters of asym-
metrical power and the epistemic demands placed on writers? Might pedagogical 
research, such as this study, explore the role of educators in affirming writers’ 
rights, leading to more relational ways of thinking about writing instruction and 
program design? Such research is needed, for as scholars, teachers, and writers, 
we will continue to face the need to speak up and to facilitate collective speak-
ing truth to power. Added to these needs, we might voice the call: “Write up!”
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n o t e s
1. Iris Young refers to anyone deemed “marginal” or “dependent” in society, including those 
who depend on others—“children, sick people, women recovering from childbirth, old people who 
have become frail, depressed or otherwise emotionally needy persons,” and so on (39). In explaining 
marginalization as one of the five faces of oppression, Young writes that being “dependent” makes 
one “subject to patronizing, punitive, demeaning, and arbitrary treatment” (39) and “implies, as it has 
in all liberal societies, a sufficient warrant to suspend basic rights to privacy, respect, and individual 
choice” (39). To this list of basic rights, I would add epistemic rights.
2. I am especially grateful for others who have described the problem of epistemic violence. 
Among these scholars, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak takes up the question “Can the subaltern speak?” 
In her seminal piece, Spivak names many underlying causes of “epistemic violence” (280), including 
Western intellectual production, international economic interests, and the power associated with 
ruling ideologies. 
3. Asserting epistemic rights can counter this dehumanization, as it involves what Keith Gi-
lyard has described as striving “to be more fully human through writing” (462). Gilyard describes 
this striving for Robert John Lewis who writes (collaboratively, with others) his way out of prison, 
and it is what “Fredrick Douglass fought for, what Paulo Freire understood, what Precious lived 
for in the novel Push” (462).
4. Heritage and Raymond explain that speakers maintain their own and respect others’ “ter-
ritories of knowledge,” which include “identity-bound knowledge”: for example, “dog and cat 
owners evidently expect to be treated as experts on their pets. Grandparents have ownership rights 
and expect to have the last word in evaluating their grandchildren. And all participants, as Sacks 
(1984) and Goffman (1983) observed, have primary rights to know and describe their thoughts and 
experiences” (36).
5. In asking us to consider a “rhetoric of difference” and to identify “markers of difference,” 
Stephanie Kerschbaum directs our attention to the negotiation of identities as difference. Alternatively, 
I would like us to think about the role of power. As I read one of Kerschbaum’s cases describing 
interactions in a peer review group, I am alerted to difference being differentially consequential: that 
is, how others recognize—or fail to recognize—a communicator’s knowledge is very much about 
power. To illustrate, Kerschbaum writes that “Choua tries to assert herself as knowledgeable and 
authoritative but is not discursively recognized as such” (117). I notice that within the group, some 
communicators (like a white student, Lindsey) speak, act, and are heard from a place of epistemic 
excess, while others (like Choua, a Hmong woman in the US Midwest) navigate already-present 
epistemic deficit. These positions of excess and deficit not only align with our “visible” and “epis-
temic identities” (Alcoff), but are also enacted, maintained, and challenged in moment-by-moment 
interactions.
6. Though debated whether CA can align with critical discourse analysis (CDA), I see this 
project as an example of such an alignment, particularly as the close analysis of turn-by-turn talk draws 
our attention to the role of institutional power in “writing up.” This study might best be described 
as “social-problem applied CA,” which offers a “standpoint for the social organizational understand-
ing of such traditionally-identified social problems as subcultures, conflict, power, troubles, and 
institutional processing” (Maynard 311).
7. All data are presented with permission of participants—gathered with informed consent and 
IRB approval. Following the tradition of CA, the case study includes transcript excerpts describing 
both verbal and nonverbal interaction, though many notations from the original transcripts have 
been removed for accessibility.
8. The various dismissals that Christine faced are documented in scholarship on medical 
rhetoric. For example, Nancy S. Lee finds that, historically, physicians have characterized patients as 
“disobedient,” “suspicious,” “overanxious,” “indifferent,” “ungrateful,” “unstable,” “impatient,” and 
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so on (140). In response to this and other problems of the medical establishment, the growing field 
of narrative medicine (e.g., Charon) encourages a more holistic, empathic, and reflective approach 
to care. Narrative medicine invites telling and listening to stories—much like what Christine and 
Theodore do in their one-with-one writing conferences.
9. With roots in the Latin hystericus—meaning “of the womb” or “suffering in the womb”—to-
day hysterical has taken on gendered connotations and, as the OED summarizes, has been “defined as 
a neurotic condition particular to women and thought to be caused by a dysfunction of the uterus.” 
In parallel with Christine’s words, during an interview, Theodore also questions whether the injus-
tice is (at least partly) gendered: “It’s unbelievable what these doctors did. I mean here’s a woman 
who’s been beaten around by the medical establishment. From her notes, it’s all male doctors. I 
don’t know if gender is a big thing in this, but it’s the whole establishment that has mistreated her.”
10. This “Doppler test with treadmill” is not to be confused with just a “Doppler test,” which 
typically takes place without the use of a treadmill. Christine received several Doppler tests, but 
none of them “with treadmill.” This distinction is important to keep in mind when reading the 
discussion that follows.
11. The transcripts here use standard conversational analysis notation. A more detailed ex-
planation can be found at http://ca-tutorials.lboro.ac.uk/notation.htm.
12. Though Christine evaluates their response as “no response,” she received a form letter 
from her integrated healthcare system stating: “Although it is difficult to hear that we failed to meet 
a patient’s expectations, feedback like yours gives us the opportunity to examine our practices. We 
will work with you to review and resolve the concerns you expressed.” Months later, after no further 
response, Christine followed up and received a letter asking her to trust the outcome: “I’m sorry but 
we cannot honor your request to disclose the notes of meetings. We simply ask that you trust us to 
make any appropriate changes to the way we provide care.” This request shows epistemic authority 
in play: those holding power (in this case, the healthcare system representing the physicians) act 
without accountability to the patient (Christine) and ask for trust—indicating an expectation that 
others assume their credibility and, hence, their epistemic rights. In the process, Christine is written 
off, denied her right to see the matter followed through.
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